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Luis T neo*
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the institutional innovations that are
expected from the recent MERCOSUR protocol on competi-
tion policy. At the national level, the protocol constitutes a
new driving force toward the conclusion of the ongoing eco-
nomic reforms in the member countries. At the regional level,
it provides an additional instrument for controlling the im-
balances of the integration process. However, since competi-
tion policy is a new subject in the region, the attainment of
these potentialities will imply a long-term cooperation effort
among MERCOSUR governments. The results of this experi-
ence will affect the debate about antitrust issues in other
forums such as the FTAA and the WTO.
I. INTRODUCTION
The harmonization of competition policies has been on the
agenda of the Common Market of the Southern Cone
(MERCOSUR) project since the signing of the Treaty of
Asunci6n in 1991.' According to its first article, the treaty
t This Article originally appeared in 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1998).
* Josh Tavares de Araujo, Jr. and Luis Tineo are Senior Trade Specialists
at the Organization of American States, where they assist the Free Trade Area of
the Americas Working Group on Competition Policy. 1889 F Street, Washington,
D.C. 20007. E-mail addresses: jtavares@oas.org and ltineo@oas.org. The views pre-
sented here are the authors' own and should not be attributed to the Organization
of American States, its General Secretariat, or any of its member countries.
1. See Treaty Establishing a Common Market Between the Argentine Repub-
lic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern
Republic of Uruguay, (MERCOSUR), Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 [hereinafter
Treaty of Asunci6n]. MERCOSUR makes up a market of 200 million people with a
GDP per capita of US $3,168. This subregional area also includes 44.3% of the
population and 53.7% of Latin America and the Caribbean. The Treaty of Asunci6n
encompasses two main instruments: (1) a four-year trade liberalization program;
and (2) a commitment to implement a common external tariff by January 1, 1995.
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involves "[t]he coordination of macroeconomic and sectoral
policies between the States Parties in the areas of foreign
trade, agriculture, industry, fiscal and monetary matters, for-
eign exchange and capital, services, customs, transport and
communications and any other areas that may be agreed upon,
in order to ensure proper competition between the States Par-
ties;"2 and therefore, "[tlhe commitment by the States Parties
to harmonize their legislation in the relevant areas in order to
strengthen the integration process.'
Under this ambitious framework, MERCOSUR countries
signed, in December 1996, a protocol that indicates the guide-
lines toward a common competition policy in the region." The
implementation of this protocol will imply, among other insti-
tutional innovations, that all member countries will have an
autonomous competition agency in the near future; that the
national law will cover the whole economy; that the competi-
tion agency will be strong enough to challenge other public
policies whenever necessary, and that the member countries
On December 17, 1994, the presidents of the MERCOSUR countries met at Ouro
Preto, Brazil to sign a Protocol containing the Common External Tariff (CET). See
Protocol de Ouro Preto, Dec. 17, 1994. The CET ranges from 0% to a maximum of
20%. The Ouro Preto Protocol also established basic institutions to oversee the
integration process. The Common Market Council is MERCOSUR's policy-making
body and is composed of foreign and economic ministers. The Common Market
Group is the executive body in charge of implementing the Treaty. The
MERCOSUR Trade Commission is the executive body in charge of enforcing the
common external trade policy. The Secretariat of MERCOSUR is in Montevideo,
Uruguay. See also Jos6 Tavares de Araujo, Jr., Industrial Restructuring and Eco-
nomic Integration: The Outlook for MERCOSUR, in BRAZIL AND THE CHALLENGE
OF ECONOMIC REFORM 95, 96 (Werner Baer & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1993) (fur-
ther analyzing the MERCOSUR integration project); Martin Arocena, Common
Market of the Southern Cone: (MERCOSUR), in INTEGRATING THE HEMISPHERE:
PERSPECTIVES FROM LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 152, 153 (Ana Julia Jatar
& Sidney Weintraub eds., 1997).
2. Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 1, at 1045.
3. Id.
4. Protocolo de Defesa da Concorrdncia no Mercosul, Decision 18/96, Dec. 17,
1996, reprinted in 19 BOLETIM DE INTEGRACAO LATINO-AMERICANA 73 (1996) [here-
inafter Protocol for the Defense of Competition]. See also ORGANIZATION OF AMERI-
CAN STATES, INVENTORY OF THE COMPETITION POLICY AGREEMENTS, TREATIES AND
OTHER ARRANGEMENTS EXISTING IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE (1997) (offering a
version of the Protocol for the Defense of Competition in English); Working Group
on Competition Policy Inventory of Domestic Laws and Regulations Relating to
Competition Policy in the Western Hemisphere (visited June 26, 1998)
<http'//www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/ourop/index.stm> (offering a version of the Pro-
tocol for the Defense of Competition in English).
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will share a common view about the interplay between compe-
tition policy and other governmental actions. Following the
MERCOSUR philosophy, the protocol does not create suprana-
tional organisms, and the effectiveness of the regional disci-
plines will rely on the enforcement power of the national agen-
cies.
This paper analyzes the potential roles to be played by this
protocol at the national and regional levels. Part II discusses
the conflicting situations that can be engendered by the pro-
cess of economic reform and examines the scope for enduring
competition rules under such circumstances. Part III reviews
the protocol, highlights the institutional requirements for its
implementation, and shows that the concept of competition
advocacy is also relevant at the regional level. Finally, some
concluding remarks are made in Part IV.
II. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND
TRANSPARENCY
The economic reforms and the preferential trade agree-
ments launched by MERCOSUR countries in the recent past
have, in principle, the same objective, which is the promotion
of a new style of economic growth based on market transparen-
cy, industrial efficiency, and consumer welfare.5 Each reform
has a particular role in this endeavor. Macroeconomic stabili-
zation should reduce the uncertainty of market signals, includ-
ing relative prices and government's credibility. Trade liberal-
ization should expose domestic firms to international competi-
tion, thus inducing lower prices and better products and servic-
es. Privatization should cut down transaction costs by improv-
ing the supply of basic services such as telecommunications,
energy and transport. Competition policy should remove entry
barriers and monitor business practices. Finally, regional inte-
gration should open new opportunities for industrial specializa-
tion and stronger international competitiveness.
Despite these promising results, economic reform can also
engender conflicting situations. For instance, the use of ex-
change rate anchors to stop inflation, combined with delays in
5. See, e.g., SEBASTIAN EDWARDS, LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: A
DECADE AFTER THE DEBT CRISIS 54-56 (1993) (discussing the long-term growth
perspectives generated by recent Latin American economic reforms).
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the execution of the fiscal reform, creates trade deficits which
bring protectionist pressures and eventual reversals in the
trade liberalizing process.6 The shortage of tax revenues con-
fuses the privatization process, by highlighting the
government's cash flow problems and distracting public atten-
tion from more important issues, such as the regulatory frame-
work to be implanted. The reintroduction of protectionist mech-
anisms and the transformation of public enterprises into pri-
vate monopolies are government-generated entry barriers that
imply additional work for the antitrust authorities. These con-
tradictions diminish the potentialities of the regional integra-
tion projects.
Moreover, the process of economic reform inaugurates a
transition period wherein the old rules have been abolished
and the new ones have yet to be enforced. This is the ideal
environment for rent-seeking activities oriented toward one-
shot gain. The most typical examples are the procedures used
for selling state firms and the temporary changes of import
tariffs. These practices provoke long-lasting distortions and
stimulate the continual postponement of some reforms, in
order to keep the channels open for attending special inter-
ests.7
Four examples from MERCOSUR are used here to illus-
trate the aforementioned issues: privatization and anti-dump-
ing actions in Argentina, and tariff swings and the automotive
regime in Brazil. By way of the privatization program imple-
mented during 1990-1992, the Argentine government sold 20
public firms and transferred to the private sector the manage-
ment of the country's most important turnpikes. This program
has generated more than 10 billion dollars, which corresponded
to about 4% of GDP and 21% of current fiscal revenues. It
included Aerolineas Argentinas, one of the largest airlines in
6. See Guillermo A. Calvo & Enrique G. Mendoza, Trade Reforms of Uncer-
tain Duration and Real Uncertainty: A First Approximation, 41 IMF STAFF PAPERS
555, 556 (1994); Rudiger Dornbusch & Alejandro Werner, Mexico: Stabilization,
Reform, and No Growth, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTiviTY 253, 254-55 (1994);
see generally Guillermo A. Calvo, On the Costs of Temporary Policy, 27 J. DEy.
ECON. 245 (1987) (discussing the conflicts that can emerge throughout the process
of economic reform).
7. See, e.g., A.E. Rodriguez & Mark D. Williams, The Effectiveness of Pro-
posed Antitrust Programs for Developing Countries, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 209, 210-16 (1994).
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Latin America, the entire telecommunications industry, steel,'
oil, gas, and electricity.' Due to their inter-industry linkages,
these sectors affect the productivity levels and the competition
conditions of the whole economy. Because of economies of scale
and scope, they are natural monopolies or oligopolies, and,
therefore, are subjected to stringent regulation in most coun-
tries.9
The process of technological convergence is transforming
several branches of activities into a unified information indus-
try, encompassing telephone, television, computer, software,
and consumer electronics. This convergence also creates new
inter-industry linkages for a variety of businesses such as
newspapers, book publishing, advertising, data processing, and
consultant services.' ° From the point of view of competition
policy, this process implies a continual review of the criteria
for measuring relevant markets, entry barriers, economies of
scope, productivity standards and market power. For the regu-
latory agencies, it means an additional challenge, which is the
establishment of accurate rules that circumvent the problems
of capture and asymmetric information without hampering the
rate of technical progress. In Argentina, like in most Latin
American economies, the debate about regulatory reform is
just beginning, but its results will delimit the enforcement
power of competition law in the country.
Another example of temporary tensions within the process
of economic reform is the recent Argentine import policy."
8. See Comision Economica para America Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), La
Crisis de la Empresa Publica, las Privatizaciones y la Equidad Social, 26 SERIE
REFORMAS DE POLTICA PUBLICA 125 (1994).
9. Regulatory reform is a sensitive issue everywhere. In the United Kingdom,
the rules for the telecommunications industry have been on the public agenda
since 1981, when British Telecom (BT) split from the Post Office. The privatization
process lasted until 1993, when the final tranche of BT's shares was sold. Accord-
ing to Armstrong et al., policy in this area is still far from settled. See MARK
ARMSTRONG ET AL., REGULATORY REFORM: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND THE BRITISH
EXPERIENCE 202-04 (1994). In the United States, the debate which led to the 1996
Telecommunications Act has been alive since 1982, when the local telephone com-
panies were separated from AT&T, and, apparently, will not be concluded soon.
For instance, Klingler argues that the Act is focused on competition problems that
were relevant in the past and does not address the current structural changes of
the information industry. See RICHARD KLINGLER, THE NEW INFORMATION INDUS-
TRY: REGULATORY CHALLENGES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 15 (1996).
10. For a lively account of this process, see KLINGLER, supra note 9.
11. See, e.g., DANIEL CHUDNOVSKY ET AL., Los LIMITES DE LA APERTURA:
1998]
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Following the regional trend, the government introduced a
series of trade liberalizing measures during the period 1989-
1993. They included the elimination of specific tariffs and sev-
eral non-tariff barriers, and the introduction of a three-tier
tariff structure (0% for raw materials, 11% for intermediate
goods and 22% for consumer goods). Although allowing room
for tariff escalation, the new structure signified a generalized
decline of protection rates throughout the economy. The only
sector that remained protected by quantitative import restric-
tions was the auto industry.
However, the 1991 macroeconomic stabilization plan pro-
voked exchange rate appreciation, trade deficits, and some
additional exceptions to the trade opening process. Since 1992,
the most relevant measures have been a 10% surcharge on
imports (the so-called "statistics tax") quotas on selected prod-
ucts from the paper and food industries, the return of specific
tariffs for a few apparel goods, and, most notably, the intense
use of anti-dumping actions. As table 1 shows, from May 1992
to May 1996, the Argentine government has initiated 128 anti-
dumping cases against 39 different countries. 2 From the
viewpoint of competition policy, all trade barriers have a simi-
lar effect, which is to strengthen the market power of domestic
firms. Among the mechanisms that reduce contestability, anti-
dumping measures are particularly efficient, because they hit
only the most aggressive potential competitors. Thus, not by
chance, Brazilian firms have been the priority targets for the
Argentine cases, due to the free trade conditions created by
MERCOSUR.
LIBERALIZACI6N, REESTRUCTURACI6N PRODUCTIVA Y MEDIO AMBIENTE 157-61 (1996)
(analyzing the economic and trade reform process in Argentina extensively).
12. These numbers have been drawn from the database developed by the
Organization of American States (OAS) for the preparatory work of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas Working Group on Subsidies, Anti-Dumping and Countervail-
ing Duties. See Working Group on Competition Policy: Inventory of Domestic Laws
and Regulations Relating to Competition Policy in the Western Hemisphere (visited
Aug. 17, 1998) <http'/www.alca-ftaa.oas.org/doc~cover/covade.htm> (making these
figures available in English).
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TABLE 1 ARGENTINA: ANTI-DUMPING ACTIONS (MAY 1992-
MAY 1996)3
Target Country Actions Target Country Actions
Brazil 33 Belgium 4
China 16 South Africa 4
United States 10 Spain 4
Germany 9 Taiwan 4
Korea 7 Japan 3
Netherlands 6 Other 28
Total 128
The Brazilian import policy promoted by the Real Plan
since July 1994 provides a complementary illustration of the
peculiar situations engendered by economic reform. During the
period 1988-1993, the government implemented a trade reform
that radically changed the conditions of competition in the
country.'4 After six decades of economic growth based on im-
port substitution policies, domestic industries were ex-
posed-for the first time-to the competition of imported goods.
The new tariff structure was supposed to grant a steady and
homogenous level of effective protection to all industries. Ac-
cordingly, by July 1993, the average rate of effective protection
was 14.5%, and only a few sectors were outside the range of
10% to 20%. The outstanding exception was, again, the auto
industry, which had a 130% protection rate. 5
However, after July 1994, import rules became volatile in
order to accommodate the amount of foreign trade to the short-
13. Source: Organization of American States.
14. See Pedro da Motta Veiga, Brazil's Strategy for Trade Liberalization and
Economic Integration in the Western Hemisphere, in INTEGRATING THE HEMISPHERE:
PERSPECTIVES FROM LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 152, 199 (Ana Julia Jatar
& Sidney Weintraub eds., 1997) (analyzing the recent economic and trade reforms
implemented in Brazil); Albert Fishlow, Is the Real Plan for Real?, in BRAZIL UN-
DER CARDOsO 43, 46-50 (Susan Kaufman Purcell & Riordan Roett eds., 1997).
15. See Hon6rio Kume, A Politica de Importa,o no Plano Real e a Estrutura
de Protedo Efetiva, in INSTITUTO DE PESQUISA ECONOMICA APLICADA 23, 23 (1996).
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run needs of the macroeconomic stabilization plan. In a first
stage that lasted until December 1994, the government's objec-
tive was to impose a quick decline of domestic prices through
currency appreciation and additional tariff reductions for goods
that had significant impact on the inflation indexes. Food prod-
ucts and basic inputs were the preferred targets, and the im-
mediate consequence was to amplify the range of effective
protection, since lower tariffs on inputs imply greater protec-
tion for final goods.
In 1995, the major macroeconomic problem was not price
discipline anymore, but rather the trade deficit. Import restric-
tions were back, with the consequences reported at tables 2 to
4. Between July 1994 and September 1996, of the 13,428 tariff
lines that compose the Brazilian Harmonized System, 11,183
items have been changed. 6 As table 3 shows, capital goods
and intermediate inputs were among the most affected indus-
tries, wherein import rules have switched more than five
times! Considering the forward linkages of these industries,
such changes signified unstable relative prices for the whole
economy. 7 Table 4 gives examples of ad hoc swings that in-
cluded assorted goods such as cars, telephone sets, detergents,
pesticides, synthetic filaments, and packing machines.
As table 4 shows, the import policy for autos has been
highly unstable since 1994. The government made a brief at-
tempt at reducing nominal protection to 20% in September
1994. Five months later it raised the tariff to 70%, and, in
December 1995, established a new set of incentives that went
beyond those granted by the Argentine automotive regime. The
Brazilian Decree No. 1763 combined all types of import substi-
tuting mechanisms: import quotas, minimum levels of domestic
inputs, export performance targets, tax rebates, and the
like.18
16. See Renato Baumann et al., As Tarifas de Importag~o no Plano Real
(1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International
Law).
17. It should be noted that, in most cases, the first tariff change was due to
the establishment of MERCOSUR CET in January 1995. See da Motta Veiga,
supra note 14, at 200. Subsequent changes have been made through continual re-
statements of the list of exceptions to the common tariff. Id.
18. Decree No. 1763, of Dec. 26, 1995 (setting an import levy of 70% and
other trade restrictions on autos, trucks, motorcycles and bicycles as of January 1,
1996). See Kume, supra note 15.
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TABLE 2 BRAziL: CHANGES OF IMPORT TARIFFs (JULY 1994-
SEPTEMBER 1996)19





Harmonized System 13,428 100.0
TABLE 3 BRAzIL: EXAMPLES OF INDUSTRIES THAT HAD
MORE THAN FIvE TARnFF CHANGES DURING 1994-
199620
HS Chapter Industry Number of Number of
Products Changes
15 Fats and oils 1 6
29 Organic chemicals 1 7
34 Cleaning agents 12
54 Synthetic filaments 7 6
76 Aluminum 2 6
83 Articles of base metal 1 6
84 Mechanical appliances 1 6
85 Electrical equipment 11 5
87 Vehicles 61 5
19. See Baumann et al., supra note 16.
20. Id.
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TABLE 4 BRAzIL: EXAMPLES OF TARIFF SWINGS 21
Product / Tariff history (Date/Duty rate)
SH Code
Pesticides 07/94 09/94 12194 05/95 11/95 0296 04/96 08/96
29.26.90.02 15 14 2 4 8 10 2 12
Detergents 07/94 01/95 05/95 11/95 02/96 04/96 08/96
34.01.19.03 10 11 4 6 8 2 18
Synthetic 07/94 09/94 11/94 0495 05/95 02196 04/96 08/96
filaments
54.02.49.02 20 16 2 0 6 10 6 16
Synthetic 07/94 09/94 11/94 0495 05/95 02/96 0496 08/96
filaments
54.02.49.04 20 16 2 0 6 10 6 16
Packing 07/94 11/94 01/95 06/95 07/95 01/96
machines
84.22.40.99 20 0 19 0 19 18
Telephone 07/94 01/95 03/95 05/95 01/96 0496
sets
85.17.10.99 30 19 70 63 56 30
Passenger 07/94 09/94 01/95 02/95 01/96 0496
cars
87.03 35 20 32 70 62 70
The automotive industry is an international oligopoly that
has a long tradition of influencing trade negotiations and na-
tional policies. The 1965 auto-pact between Canada and the
United States, the export promotion policies implemented by
the Brazilian government in the seventies, the 1981 U.S.-Ja-
pan voluntary export (VER) agreement, and the tariff swings
listed in table 4 are just a few examples of that tradition. Due
to the industry's size and production linkages, the investment
decisions made by the assembly firms often generate macroeco-
nomic consequences that affect not only employment and GDP
growth rates, but also the balance of payments conditions and
the national rhythm of technical progress. Since these econom-
ic figures can be easily transformed into political power, the
21. Id.
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auto industry has been able to extract privileges from govern-
ments worldwide for many decades.
Besides the market distortions already illustrated by the
preceding examples, the automotive regime raises an addition-
al challenge to the enforcement of competition rules in
MERCOSUR. Imagine that the Brazilian antitrust authorities
have found convincing evidence of price-fixing among the
industry's leading firms. The most immediate action for re-
pressing such behavior would be to stimulate import competi-
tion, a solution that the government could not allow at this
moment. An eventual surge of car imports would contradict not
only the provisions of Decree No. 1763, but, more importantly,
the current macroeconomic priorities of controlling the trade
deficit and ensuring the credibility of the Real Plan.
Under this awkward circumstance, the best strategy for
the antitrust authorities would be the promotion of market
transparency, as a first step toward enduring competition rules
in the long run. This can be attained by a system of economic
indicators that would keep the public informed about the cur-
rent conditions of competition in the country. The system
should include all the relevant industries and describe their
evolution in terms of size, structure, efficiency patterns, entry
barriers, and market power of incumbent firms. These indica-
tors would provide answers for the three basic questions that
can be raised about the current conditions of competition,
namely: Do they impose enough discipline on the established
firms, thereby protecting the public interest, or leave open
space for unfair practices? Do they allow domestic producers to
follow the international rhythm of technical progress? Are the
regulated industries meeting the international levels of produc-
tivity?2
2
Among the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development) countries, publicity has proven to be the
prime enforcement mechanism of antitrust law, and the most
compelling case has been the Swedish experience since 1946.
In that year, a new law was enacted with surprising provi-
22. See, e.g., Jos6 Tavares de Araujo, Jr., Contestability and Economic Integra-
tion in the Western Hemisphere, (OAS Trade unit stud., 1995) (discussing the use
of economic indicators as competition policy instruments); Jos Tavares de Araujo,
Jr., The Use of Economic Indicators as Competition Policy Instruments (OAS Trade
unit stud., 1996).
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sions: the government was responsible for investigating restric-
tive practices and for announcing the findings, but had no
castigating authority. As Bourdet commented: "[No fines could
be imposed on firms involved in restrictive practices with
harmful effects and no legislative provision existed that gave
competition authorities the power to force firms to terminate
restrictive practices agreements. Making information about
these firms and their behavior public was considered sufficient
to convince them to respect the legislation and to adopt the
competitive straitjacket."" Subsequently, that law was
amended in 1953, 1956, and 1982, and certain enforcing rules
were gradually introduced. As the antitrust authorities re-
mained peaceful, however, very few cases have been taken to
court. According to Bourdet, this reflects the government's view
"that a more conciliatory policy of negotiating with firms who
have violated the restrictive practices legislation will bring
more positive effects for society than would court proceed-
ings."2
In sum, the foregoing evidence shows that the main prob-
lem faced by antitrust agencies in MERCOSUR, as well as in
Latin America, is not to discipline the private sector but to
cope with inconsistent governmental actions. The only feasible
instrument for this endeavor is competition advocacy, which
promotes transparency and, consequently, the political condi-
tions for abolishing the inconsistent actions.' Competition
23. Yves Bourdet, Policy Toward Market Power and Restrictive Practices, in
INTERNATIONALIZATION, MARKET POWER AND CONSUMER WELFARE 299, 301 (Yves
Bourdet ed., 1992).
24. Id. at 314.
25. Competition advocacy commonly refers to the role of the antitrust authori-
ties in removing trade distorting barriers in the economy beyond the traditional
prosecution of anticompetitive practices. For the most part, this component focuses
on identifying either public policies promoted by other authorities within the gov-
ernment or rent-seeking activities by interest groups aimed at obtaining protection-
ist gains to the detriment of consumer welfare and economic efficiency pursued by
trade liberalization and competition policies. It has been increasingly recognized
among experts and enforcers that most of the expected benefits from trade liberal-
ization and regulatory reforms have been subverted during the transition period
from the government distributive model to a market-oriented one. In this environ-
ment, free trade and deregulation have not been able to properly foster competi-
tion despite the passing of competition laws. See generally A.E. Rodriguez &
Malcolm B. Coate, Competition Policy in Transition Economies: The Role of Compe-
tition Advocacy, 23 BROOK. J. INTL L. 365, 367 (1997) (analyzing the arguments
supporting competition advocacy efforts); A.E. Rodriguez & Malcolm B. Coate,
Limits to Antitrust Policy for Reforming Economies, 1 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 311, 313
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advocacy also plays a similar role at the regional level, as the
next section reports.
III. TOWARD COMPETITION POLICY IN MERCOSUR: THE
PROTOCOL FOR THE DEFENSE OF COMPETITION
With the progressive elimination of tariffs and non-tariff
barriers, MERCOSUR countries have certainly improved mar-
ket access and promoted trade and investment among its mem-
bers. However, as regional markets expand, so do
anticompetitive and rent-seeking practices, as domestic firms
tend to cooperate to keep out new competitors. Besides, inter-
national firms looking for monopolistic profits and easy capture
of export markets prefer those countries where competition
laws do not exist or are weakly enforced. Finally, governments
can also contribute to these trends, as Part II described.
To approach these issues, MERCOSUR countries passed,
at a meeting of the Common Market Council, held in
Fortaleza, Brazil in December 1996, the Decision 17/96 con-
taining the Protocol for the Defense Competition in
MERCOSUR (The Protocol).26 This document, part of a com-
prehensive agenda for common trade policies beyond the exter-
nal tariff scheme, is pending upon congressional approval by
each member country to be enforceable as national law. It was
drafted by the MERCOSUR's Trade Commission over the past
two years, based on the mandates set forth in the Decision
21/94 which issued guidelines for harmonizing competition law
in the subregion.
The Protocol's goals are threefold. First, it provides mecha-
nisms to control firms' anticompetitive practices with a
MERCOSUR dimension. Second, it calls for convergent domes-
tic laws in order to ensure similar conditions of competition
and independence among firms regarding the formation of
prices and other market variables. Third, it provides an agen-
da for surveilling public policies that distort competition condi-
(1996); R. Shyam Khemani, The Role and Importance of Competition Advocacy in
Promoting Competition, Paper Presented at the Emerging Market Economy Forum:
Workshop on Competition Policy and Enforcement (Oct. 28-30, 1996); William E.
Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transi-
tion Economies, 23 BROOK J. INTL L. 403, 450-51 (1997) (proposing a gradualist
strategy as the best alternative for transition economies).
26. See Protocol for the Defense of Competition, supra note 4.
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tions and affect trade among the member countries. Thus, the
MERCOSUR competition protocol should be an instrument for
abolishing obstacles to the enlargement of the regional market.
From this viewpoint, The Protocol cannot be seen just as a set
of rules to be applied to anticompetitive practices with extra-
territorial implications. Rather, it is more far-reaching. It deals
with both government and firms' interference with the compe-
tition process. Competition benefits, whether related to effi-
ciency, consumer welfare or deconcentration of economic power,
are not expressly considered in The Protocol. They are expect-
ed, however, as a result of a larger market with more partici-
pants.
Like other MERCOSUR provisions, The Protocol is not
oriented toward supranational mechanisms. Rather, it is based
on cooperation within the region and enforced at a national
level. However, MERCOSUR institutions are expected to devel-
op and enforce competition rules on cases of extraterritorial
effects. In this regard, The Protocol's approach shares many
features of the Australia-New Zealand antitrust accord.
MERCOSUR institutions have a role in guiding The Protocol's
implementation by the member countries, as will be further
examined, and the provisions may serve either as instruments
for political mediation or for the enforcement of common rules.
Since there is little experience in MERCOSUR on the use of
competition law, The Protocol identifies the issues of concern
and provides instruments for solving them.
A. Anticompetitive Practices of MERCOSUR Dimension
Restrictive agreements are the most visible response to the
pressures that the newcomers bring after the elimination of
trade barriers. The Protocol seeks to prevent any concerted
practice between competing firms or individual abuse of domi-
nant position aimed at limiting competition in the
MERCOSUR market. Its provisions apply to acts performed by
any person, natural or legal, private or public, including State
enterprises and natural monopolies, so long as such practices
have extraterritorial effects."7 The list includes price-fixing,
restraints, reductions or destructions of input and output,
market division, restriction of market access, bid-rigging,
27. Id. art. 4.
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exclusionary practices, tying arrangements, refusal to deal,
resale price maintenance, market division, predatory practices,
price discrimination, exclusive dealings, and abuse of dominant
position.28
The Protocol is enforced by the Trade Commission of
MERCOSUR and the Committee for the Defense of Competi-
tion.29 The Trade Commission has adjudicative functions,
while the Committee for the Defense of Competition is respon-
sible for the investigation and evaluation of cases. Modeled
after the Brazilian law, the proceedings and adjudication of
cases are conducted in three stages. Proceedings are initiated
before the competition authority of each country at the inter-
ested party's request. ° Briefly, the competition agency, after
a preliminary determination on whether the practice has
MERCOSUR implications, may submit the case before the
Committee for a second determination. Both evaluations must
follow a rule of reason analysis in which a definition of the
relevant market, and evidence of the conduct and the economic
effects must be provided. Based on this evaluation, the Com-
mittee must decide whether the practice violates The Protocol
and recommend whether sanctions or other measures should
be imposed. The Committee ruling is submitted to the Trade
Commission for final adjudication by means of a Directive.3 '
As part of these procedures, The Protocol establishes provi-
sions for preventive measures and undertakings of cessation.
This mechanism allows the defendant to cease the investigated
practice under compliance of certain obligations agreed upon
with the Committee. The monitoring of these measures and
the enforcement of the sanctions rests with the national com-
petition authorities."
Some problems may be anticipated with this system. As
previously mentioned, the substantive and procedural provi-
sions of The Protocol apply only to practices with MERCOSUR
implications. Given the fact that the national agencies, the
28. Id. art. 6.
29. Both bodies are composed of representatives from each member country.
However, in the case of the Trade Committee, countries' representatives must
come from the respective competition agencies. Id. arts. 8-9.
30. Id. at ch. V.
31. Id.
32. Id. at ch. VI.
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Committee and the Trade Commission are independent in
their judgements at each stage and that one can overrule the
other at the following stage, the process of defining the
MERCOSUR dimension of each case may be cumbersome un-
der this system. At each stage, the agency may apply a differ-
ent criterion to define the relevant market. For instance, the
national agencies may well use a restrictive criterion for mar-
ket definition and close the investigation. The opposite may
occur if the applied criteria are more permissive. The same
problems can be anticipated regarding the evaluation of the
evidence and the economic effects of the practice. There is a
large controversy about the limitations of applying economic
analysis to anticompetitive practices. Nonetheless, assuming
that each criterion is adequately defined by the national agen-
cies, it does not ensure that other definitions and approaches
may not be yielded by the Committee. Likewise, although it is
expected that the Committee's rulings are adopted by the
Trade Commission, the latter has the power to overrule the
former based on its own criteria.
Furthermore, given the little experience developed by each
country regarding these practices, both the preliminary and
the Committee analyses may lead to inconsistent results. This
may well open doors for discretion and political influence at
any stage if the bodies base their decisions on considerations
other than technical ones, particularly in the analysis of the
practices' effects on the market. Thus, it remains to be seen
how well the inter-governmental coordination mechanisms of
The Protocol work, and how sound and politically neutral are
the criteria applied to the practices investigated. These issues
lead to a consideration of a more preventive approach toward
the practices of an extraterritorial dimension, since many of
these practices are possible only when there is an imbalance
regarding their treatment at each national level. To address
this crucial area, The Protocol contains provisions for the har-
monization of domestic competition policy and law.
B. Harmonization of Domestic Competition Law
Within any regional agreement, governments may still
protect domestic firms after dismantling border controls, either
by failing to provide (or provide inadequately) proper competi-
tion regulations and institutions or simply by deliberate non-
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enforcement of them. These attitudes produce a new type of
market "advantage" over countries with stricter competition
rules. Two typical procedures performed by firms outside a
country which distort competition conditions in the domestic
market may illustrate the need for harmonization: price dis-
crimination and collusion.
International price discrimination is the result of setting
prices in the export market below those of the national market.
Firms usually do this with the aim of penetrating new mar-
kets, eliminating competition and, once there, raising prices in
monopolistic circumstances. Such practices are feasible when
the exporting firm enjoys a dominant position in its domestic
market. This condition is reached either by structural barriers
that prevent market access to firms from other countries, or by
anticompetitive practices that prevail in the firms' market. In
both circumstances, the exporting firm has the ability to im-
pose prices and other commercial conditions into its market,
which are sufficient to enable it to set lower prices in the for-
eign market, or to enter into concerted action with the domi-
nant firms in the foreign market.3
Practices involving collusion are the result of agreement
between competitors in the domestic market (export or import
cartels) or between competitors of the domestic country and
the foreign country (international cartels) with the purpose of
increasing market power by dividing markets or fixing output
and prices. This type of practice is difficult to counteract, basi-
cally because it is achieved by taking advantage of a position of
33. International price discrimination is a practice rarely combatted by means
of competition laws. Both the antitrust analysis and the enforcement mechanisms
available have not led countries' authorities to come up with sound criteria to
judge these cases. Rather, the treatment of this practice has been addressed by
trade remedy laws, specifically by anti-dumping laws. The use, goals and benefits
of anti-dumping laws compared'to competition laws are the subject of a well-
known debate on whether anti-dumping laws should be replaced by competition
laws. Within MERCOSUR, this discussion has just started. Although The Protocol
does not replace the anti-dumping mechanism, it does provide tools to approach
the problem from a competition policy point of view. See Bernard M. Hoekman &
Petros C. Mavroidis, Dumping, Antidumping and Antitrust, 30 J. WORLD TRADE
27, 27-36 (1996); Jorge Miranda, Should Antidumping Laws be Dumped?, 28 LAW
& POLY INTL Bus. 255, 282 (1996) (discussing the tools needed to approach the
debate from a competition policy point of view); Clarisse Morgan, Competition
Policy and Anti-Dumping: Is It Time for a Reality Check?, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 61,
62-63 (1996).
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impunity or immunity with respect to competition laws. As-
suming the existence of competition laws in the countries in-
volved, because such practices are detected within the foreign
country, it will be difficult to enforce them because the compe-
tition agency has to verify the existence of monopolistic practic-
es or market barriers in other jurisdictions.
When monopolistic practices are not verified in the country
where the distortion was created, firms may act freely. For
example, if discriminatory prices are detected in the importing
country, competition laws are irrelevant. First, due to the ju-
risdiction problem, and second because such prices have no
anticompetitive impact on the domestic market of the export-
ing country. Indeed, the peculiarity of this kind of discrimina-
tion is to distort only the conditions of production in the im-
porting country, but not the trading partner's market, where
the competition law could be applied. The case of collusion
agreements is the same, and difficulties are greater if the prac-
tices in question are implemented by firms protected by rules
of exception, which exclude them from the sphere of competi-
tion law, i.e., state monopolies, export cartels or enterprises in
sectors or activities which have been exempted. 4
The provisions of The Protocol dealing with practices in
extraterritorial effects touch upon these issues. They seek to
solve problems whose causes may well be attributed to a lack
of competition enforcement in the countries where the investi-
gated firms operate. As usual, it is more costly to remedy facts
afterwards than to prevent them. Relying exclusively on The
Protocol provisions may be risky. It would be more effective to
apply common standards where the practice originated and
leave only complex cases to the MERCOSUR institutions. By
addressing anticompetitive practices with standards directed at
the behavior of firms on their turf, governments eliminate a
typical root of potential market fragmentation.
The only successful experience reported on agreements
whose application does not depend upon supranational organs
34. See Bernard Hoekman, Trade and Competition Policy in Regional Agree-
ments, Paper Presented at the Conference of Private Practices and Trade Policy:
The Future of International Rules on Antidumping and Competition (Nov. 1997).
See also GABRIELLE MARCEAU, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-TRUST ISSUES IN FREE-




has been that of the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic
Relations Trade Agreement of 1983 (ANCERTA), which estab-
lished a mandate for the harmonization of restrictive commer-
cial practices. 5 This mandate resulted in New Zealand's adop-
tion (in 1986) of a new competition law assimilated to the
terms of Australia's laws. In 1988, both countries adopted a
protocol, following which the application of antidumping mea-
sures was eliminated, and agreement was reached regarding
the application of competition laws to conduct affecting trade
between the countries. Furthermore, the powers of inquiry of
the agencies were extended to jurisdiction in the other country
by requiring companies subject to inquiry to provide informa-
tion. The case of Australia and New Zealand exhibits many
helpful analogies in treating the subject of integration agree-
ments, as in the case of MERCOSUR.36
To this end, The Protocol calls upon the member countries
"to adopt within the period of two years, common rules for the
control of acts and contracts, of any kind, which may limit or
in any way cause prejudice to free trade, or result in the domi-
nation of the relevant regional market of goods and services,
including which result in economic concentration, with a view
to preventing their possible anticompetitive effects in the
framework of MERCOSUR." 7 Furthermore, it also calls upon
the countries to "undertake, within a two year period, to draft
joint standards and mechanisms which shall govern State aid
susceptible to limit, restrict, falsify or distort competition and
to affect trade between the States Parties."38 These provisions
set up the basis for a comprehensive competition policy harmo-
nization to be completed by the end of 1998. The process, as
clearly stated, goes beyond the treatment of anticompetitive
practices to include structure concerns and competition advoca-
cy. For MERCOSUR countries, this means a long road of work.
At present, competition is approached very differently by
MERCOSUR countries. For instance, Uruguay and Paraguay
35. Closer Economic Relations-Trade Agreement, Mar. 28, 1983, Austl.-N.Z., 22
I.L.M. 945 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1983) [hereinafter ANCERTA].
36. See Rex J. Ahdar, The Role of Antitrust Policy in the Development of Aus-
tralian-New Zealand Free Trade, 12 NW. J. INTL L. & BUS. 317, 317-22 (1991)
(detailing ANCERTA's competition policy harmonization component and develop-
ments).
37. Protocol for the Defense of Competition, supra note 4, art. 7.
38. Id. art. 32.
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do not have competition laws in place, leaving this process to
be governed by the market following trade liberalization and
deregulation. In Argentina and Brazil, although competition
laws exist, their components, enforcement mechanisms and
policy goals differ greatly.39 In Argentina, the competition re-
gine focuses only on preventing anticompetitive conduct.4' At
present, the Argentine Congress is working on a bill to im-
prove the enforcement of the current law, clarify enforcement
standards, introduce the evaluation of economic concentrations,
and make the Competition Commission independent from the
Ministry of Economy.41 In Brazil, the amendments introduced
to the law in 1994 made competition policy a critical comple-
ment of its trade and investment policies.42  They raised
CADE (Brazilian Competition Agency) to a status independent
of the Ministry of Justice, of which it had previously been a
subordinate part. CADE was given competition advocacy pow-
ers to ensure that conditions encouraging competition would
not be affected by other provisions connected with privatization
and regulatory reform of natural monopolies. Regulations were
introduced to control economic concentrations, anticompetitive
practices were more broadly defined, and CADE was given
more precise standards for analyzing and evaluating such
practices.43 This has made Brazil's policy contrast with the
rest of MERCOSUR, being the only one showing initial signs of
39. See Malcolm Rowat et al., Competition Policy and MERCOSUR, World
Bank Technical Paper No. 385 (1997) (investigating MERCOSUR countries' domes-
tic regulations on trade, investment and competition).
40. See Protection of Competition Law No. 22,262, July 7, 1980 [350] B.O.
Argentina passed the region's first competition law in 1919, being amended in
1947 and 1980. See also Guillermo Cabanellas & Wolf Etzrodt, The New Argentine
Antitrust Law: Competition as an Economic Policy Instrument, 17 J. WORLD TRADE
34, 34-35 (1983) (outlining related literature on the Argentine law). See also C1
WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION § 2.01 (Julian 0. von Kalinowski ed., 1986) (offering
a version of the law in English).
41. See Rowat et al., supra note 39.
42. Law for the Prevention of Practices Against the Economic Order, Decreto
No. 8.884, of June 11, 1994, 1 D.O.U. of June 13, 1994. Prior to this law, Brazil
enacted its first law on competition in 1962, being amended in 1990, 1991 and
1994. See Dallal Stevens, Framing Competition Law within an Emerging Economy:
The Case of Brazil, 75 ANTITRUST BuLL. 929 (1995); Rowat et al., supra note 39.
See also CADE Homepage (visited June 25, 1998) <http'J/www.
mj.gov.br/cade/mg_defa.htm> (detailing related information on Brazil's competition
law); 1 COMMERCIAL & INVESTMENT: LATIN AMERICA Doc. 2.7-1 (Andrea Bonime-
Blanc ed., 1996) (offering a version of this law in English).
43. See Rowat et al., supra note 39.
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the coherent approach conceived by The Protocol.
At a MERCOSUR level, each country's approach also re-
mains to be seen. It is possible that countries apply identical
standards for both domestic and external trade restraints or
differently for domestic and external trade, restricting the
protection of competition in favor of domestic consumers and
permitting anticompetitive practices aimed at boosting the
export capacity of domestic firms. In addition to the substan-
tive differences in approach to the fostering of competition,
countries may differ in their enforcement methods. It could be
possible that some countries, though their laws may penalize
the same practices, differ in how to define them and measure
their effects on competition. Similarly, in some countries the
laws may not be enforced or the agencies may not be sufficient-
ly trusted. In some countries, industrial policies may be used
to foster competition. In some countries, the focus is more on
market structures than on the behavior of firms. In some coun-
tries sizable sectors may be exempt from the competition re-
gime, while in others specific anticompetitive practices may be
subject to administrative authorizations.
These differences may be more likely to be encountered
when certain practices are deemed to spur trade and lead to
more efficient production, as is the case of mergers and other
economic concentrations, mentioned as well in The Protocol.
The quest for monopolistic profits based on each country's type
of action or omission in regard to competition triggers a num-
ber of practices that affect market integration. Since fostering
competition conditions in integrated economies depends not
only upon the observance of antitrust rules, but also upon the
continual surveillance of trade and investment barriers, a
competition advocacy component is included in The Protocol.
C. Regional Competition Advocacy
The use of common competition rules to correct the imbal-
ances of the integration process can lead to different styles of
law enforcement. Two factors, advanced-among others-by
Rodriguez and Williams, highlight the risks of an exclusive
focus on prosecuting anticompetitive practices at any cost.
First, the evidence linking trade growth to anticompetitive
practices is yet to be gathered. Second, there is also lack of
data on the welfare costs from extraterritorial anticompetitive
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practices compared with the cost of prosecuting and sanction-
ing them." It is true that price discrimination and cartels are
harmful practices to the integration process and they deserve
scrutiny. However, consideration must be given to the costs
and limited technical capabilities of both the MERCOSUR
institutions and the national agencies in handling these cases.
A more promising alternative is to promote regional com-
petition advocacy, at least during the consolidation period of
integration, for the reasons discussed in Part II. As we saw, in
a context of unfinished reforms, transparency is the main in-
strument for controlling both anticompetitive practices and
inconsistent government policies. To this extent, a technical
committee on public policies that distort competitiveness has
been operating since 1995." Its goal is to identify government
measures affecting competition and decide whether they are
compatible with the operation of the customs union. The scope
of measures examined include exceptions granted under the
MERCOSUR regime, taxes, government procurement, and
other discriminatory policies.
This committee has advanced little in its agenda, as there
are many conflicting topics involved. However, there are two
areas related to firms' performance not covered by any
MERCOSUR instrument which deserve attention. The former
is the harmonization of regulatory frameworks to natural mo-
nopolies run either by State enterprises or by privatized firms.
The latter are the treatment of dumping actions and the pro-
gressive elimination of the dual standard of analysis for export
prices and domestic prices for one favoring the application of a
harmonized competition regime. The Protocol is particularly
keen in regard to State subsidies that affect competition condi-
tions.46 If the Committee is successful in identifying and elim-
inating the distorting fiscal incentives existing in MERCOSUR
countries, it could turn this committee into a center forum to
advance further initiatives in those untouched areas.
The harmonization process of such diverse areas of compe-
44. AE. RODRIGUEZ & MARK D. WII.IA !s, Do WE NEED COMPETITION POLICY
IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY? (Center for Trade & Commercial Diplomacy
Working Paper No. 5, Mar. 1997).
45. MERCOSUR/CMO/DEC No. 20/94 on Politicas Publicas que Distorsionan la
Competitividad. See INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1 MERCOSUR REP. 26
(1997).
46. Protocol for the Defense of Competition, supra note 4, art. 32.
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tit-on requires the accomplishment of a number of prior sub-
processes such as, for instance, those listed in article 30 of The
Protocol. The program of cooperation therein described will
allow countries to identify grounds of commonality and diver-
gence regarding the goals and scope of competition and its
implications for MERCOSUR integration. It will also lead to
the identification of exceptions which might allow those
anticompetitive practices that affect the market of another
country, i.e., state monopolies and import and export cartels.
These efforts may engender a coherent set of regulations on
conduct and structure, as well as common procedural rules and
enforcement standards to be applied by independent agencies.
The final outcome will be a common approach to the treatment
of anticompetitive practices, i.e., horizontal and vertical prac-
tices and abuse of dominant position, especially those of a
discriminatory nature as well as methodologies for merger
evaluation.
Although not explicit in The Protocol, the above coopera-
tion program includes four clear cut stages of implementation
at the national level. A crucial peculiarity of this process is
that each stage can only be developed after the attainment of
the preceding one. The first stage is the enactment of a nation-
al law containing the provisions required by The Protocol. The
second is the creation of an autonomous and properly staffed
antitrust agency. The third is the establishment of transparent
operational routines by the antitrust agency, such as the publi-
cation of annual reports, guidelines to orient the private sector,
consistent enforcement criteria, etc. The fourth is the consoli-
dation of competition advocacy as the fundamental domestic
task of the antitrust agency.
IV. CONCLUSION
Until a few years ago antitrust was just a domestic issue
in some advanced economies. Nowadays it has a new ti-
tle-competition policy-and has become a noteworthy topic on
the international agenda. This change was provoked by several
factors, such as the simultaneous trends toward globalization
and regional integration, the rebirth of capitalism in Eastern
Europe, the Latin American economic reforms, the creation of
the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the new analytical
instruments for dealing with regulatory reform in open econo-
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mies.
It is therefore a new subject everywhere. At the WTO, the
debate about the effectiveness of a multilateral agreement on
competition rules is yet to begin. As Hoekman observed, the
possible outcomes may vary from doing nothing to a fully har-
monized international law, and a consensus view is far from
emerging.4 Within the scope of the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), a working group on competition policy was
established in May 1996. Its mandate includes, among other
initiatives, the exchange of views on the operation of competi-
tion policy regimes in the region, the identification of coopera-
tion mechanisms among governments, and the elaboration of
specific recommendations on how to proceed in this matter.48
In this context, if the institutional innovations discussed in
this paper are accomplished, the MERCOSUR Protocol will
turn into a basic reference on the harmonization of competition
policy among trading partners. Otherwise, it probably will add
complexity to an already intricate theme.
47. Bernard Hoekman, Harmonising Competition Policy in the WTO System, 1
WoRLD ECON. AFF. 39, 41 (1997).
48. See Working Group on Competition Policies OAS/IDBECLAC Tripartite
Committee Homepage (visited Aug. 17, 1998) <http/www.alca-ftaa.oas.org> (citing
information on the development of the preparatory work for the FTAA, particularly
in the area of competition policy).
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